Copeland-Global-Minimax

Violation of Strategy Proofness

Profile type: Profile
Config: 4 c, 4 v
Parameters: ∅

Violation of Strategy-Proofness for Copeland-Global-Minimax under the single-winner set preference.
A voter can benefit by changing their ranking from (3, 2, 1, 0) to (0, 3, 1, 2).

Original Profile:
+---+---+---+
| 2 | 1 | 1 |
+---+---+---+
| 2 | 3 | 3 |
| 1 | 0 | 2 |
| 3 | 1 | 1 |
| 0 | 2 | 0 |
+---+---+---+
Profile([[2, 1, 3, 0], [3, 0, 1, 2], [3, 2, 1, 0]], rcounts=[2, 1, 1], cmap={0: '0', 1: '1', 2: '2', 3: '3'})

Copeland-Global-Minimax winner is {2}

New Profile:
+---+---+---+---+
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
+---+---+---+---+
| 2 | 2 | 3 | 0 |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 3 |
| 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 |
| 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
+---+---+---+---+
Profile([[2, 1, 3, 0], [2, 1, 3, 0], [3, 0, 1, 2], [0, 3, 1, 2]], rcounts=[1, 1, 1, 1], cmap={0: '0', 1: '1', 2: '2', 3: '3'})

Copeland-Global-Minimax winner is {3}