Profile type: Profile
Config: 3 c, 2 v
Parameters: set_preference=pessimist
Violation of Strategy-Proofness for Condorcet under the pessimist set preference.
A voter can benefit by changing their ranking from (2, 1, 0) to (1, 0, 2).
Original Profile:
+---+---+
| 1 | 1 |
+---+---+
| 1 | 2 |
| 2 | 1 |
| 0 | 0 |
+---+---+
Profile([[1, 2, 0], [2, 1, 0]], rcounts=[1, 1], cmap={0: '0', 1: '1', 2: '2'})
Condorcet winners are {0, 1, 2}
New Profile:
+---+---+
| 1 | 1 |
+---+---+
| 1 | 1 |
| 2 | 0 |
| 0 | 2 |
+---+---+
Profile([[1, 2, 0], [1, 0, 2]], rcounts=[1, 1], cmap={0: '0', 1: '1', 2: '2'})
Condorcet winner is {1}