Condorcet Plurality

Violation of Strategy Proofness

Profile type: Profile
Config: 3 c, 7 v
Parameters: ∅

Violation of Strategy-Proofness for Condorcet Plurality under the single-winner set preference.
A voter can benefit by changing their ranking from (1, 2, 0) to (1, 0, 2).

Original Profile:
+---+---+---+---+
| 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 |
+---+---+---+---+
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| 2 | 0 | 2 | 1 |
| 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
+---+---+---+---+
Profile([[0, 2, 1], [1, 0, 2], [1, 2, 0], [2, 1, 0]], rcounts=[2, 1, 2, 2], cmap={0: '0', 1: '1', 2: '2'})

Condorcet Plurality winner is {2}

New Profile:
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| 2 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| 1 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
Profile([[0, 2, 1], [0, 2, 1], [1, 0, 2], [1, 2, 0], [2, 1, 0], [2, 1, 0], [1, 0, 2]], rcounts=[1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1], cmap={0: '0', 1: '1', 2: '2'})

Condorcet Plurality winner is {1}